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ABSTRACT
An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Primacy
Evidence from Asia and the Americas
This paper tests the relationship between primacy and economic development for countries in Asia and the
Americas.  It tests explanations for primacy drawn from several social-science disciplines--demography,
economics, geography, political science, and sociology.  The study is one of the first to use panel-data
estimators for the tests. Economic and domestic political variables are found to be important determinants
of primacy. In particular, rent-seeking and dictatorial governments are associated with primacy, but the
association exists independent of the level of economic development.  The implication from dependency and
world-system theories that current international economic interactions promote primacy is not supported.  It
also examines the hypothesis that primacy first increases and then decreases with GDP per capita.1
An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Primacy
Evidence from Asia and the Americas
I.  Introduction
Urban primacy refers to a country’s largest one or two cities being”abnormally” large (using an
adverb from Jefferson’s (1939) seminal study) relative to the country’s next largest cities.  In discussing
urbanization and development Bairoch considers both absolute and relative dimensions; he says,”Another
direct consequence of the urban explosion is the great size of Third World cities.  Today too great a
proportion of the urban population lives in cities of excessive size . . .” (Bairoch 1988, 511).  He further
argues that rapid urbanization and concentration in large cities are largely independent of economic forces
and harmful to economic performance.  Mills and Hamilton (1994) agree that excessive primacy and
excessive urbanization can result if there are negative externalities associated with urban size.  They
caution, however, that positive externalities also exist, and that there is no presumption that primacy is
excessive.  Part of this controversy arises from disagreements about the source of urban primacy.  If the
concentration of population in large cities arises from the economic calculations of individual decision
makers responding to economic incentives, this concentration is more likely to benefit the economy than if it
arises from noneconomic forces.
Carroll (1982) finds three major classes of explanations of urban primacy in the literature--
economic, political, and world systems (including international dependency and ecology approaches).  The
main purpose of this paper is to develop empirical evidence related to Carroll’s three major classes of
explanations.  We empirically examine these explanations and find support for internal economic and
political explanations of primacy, as it has developed in the post-colonial era in countries in Asia and the
Americas.  We find little support, however, for the world-systems explanations, or more generally,
explanations based on external economic or political forces.  In sharp contrast to previous studies, such as
Mutlu (1989), we find that primacy increases with GDP per capita and two other development indicators--
industrialization and education.  
This paper extends the existing literature on the empirical determinants of urban primacy in at least
four ways.  First, it examines three primacy measures that incorporate information about the upper end of2
the size distribution of cities--the ratio of the size of the largest city to the size of the second largest city, the
ratio of the size of the largest city to the next three largest cities, and the ratio of the size of the two largest
cities to the size of the next two largest cities.  Importantly, the results are robust with regard to the
different primacy measures.
Second, the paper uses time-series, cross-section (panel) data. Its application of fixed- and random-
effects estimators to panel data overcomes some statistical problems with cross-section studies.  It also
permits a cross-country comparison that is not possible with single-country studies, such as Alperovich’s
(1992) careful time-series study of urban concentration in Israel.   Alperovich argues that a bell-shaped
relation between concentration and development emerges in his study, and not in others, because the bell
shape is a characteristic of individual countries over time, and not of a cross section. Thus, to capture
important aspects of the relationship between primacy and development across countries, it is necessary to
have time-series data for a cross-section of countries--panel data. The use of panel data and panel data
techniques are important features of this study.
Third, we propose a simple economic model of primacy that permits a clear test of the proposition
that primacy responds reasonably to economic considerations.  The size of the estimated country effects in
this model provides a measure of the degree of primacy.  With this measure, we can say that adjusted for
economic conditions, one country has more primacy than another, if it has a larger country effect.
Although this does not provide the norm that Gilbert and Gugler (1992) say is missing from the primacy
discussion, it does provide a measure of primacy differentials.
Fourth, an expansion of the basic economic model permits tests of additional economic,
demographic, political, and other explanations of primacy.  The social science literature on urban primacy
and economic development is vast, spanning demography, economics, geography, history, political science,
and sociology.  We do not attempt to summarize or analyze this literature; instead, we summarize enough
to motivate the empirical tests.  (See, e.g., Alwosabi (1995), Carroll (1982), Gilbert and Gugler (1992),
Mutlu (1989), and Sheppard (1982)) for extensive surveys.)  For these additional tests, we take variables
used in the literature by proponents of various positions, making our tests pertinent for the conversation.
1
We continue by discussing the data and developing an empirical model for estimation.  Although3
we do not derive a formal model, our basic approach borrows from Brueckner (1990) and includes
elements from Henderson (1988, 1996), Krugman (1996), and Moomaw and Shatter (1996).   The
fundamental premise of the model is that urbanization patterns derive from individual decision-making in
response to market forces, which vary in systematic ways with economic variables.  This model is
estimated with country fixed effects, reducing bias problems associated with omitted variables under the
assumption that any omitted variables are correlated with the fixed effects.  The model is then expanded to
test alternative explanations.  Finally, a model of the determinants of the country effects is estimated.
II. The Data and the Problem
This paper is concerned with urban primacy in selected countries of Asia and North and South
America.   Our purpose in studying urban primacy is to isolate factors that, using Jefferson’s (1939)
adverb, cause a country’s largest city to be ”abnormally” large relative to other cities.  No objective
criterion exists, however, to measure what is”abnormally” large.  One approach is to develop a measure of
the deviation of the size distribution of cities from a norm, such as the rank-size rule or some other
distribution derived from a stochastic model. Sheppard (1982), for instance, proposes an index that
measures primacy as deviations from a rank-size relationship. Such measures are necessary in dealing with
some size-distribution issues.  For instance, Sheppard’s purposes are to evaluate the use of a predetermined
distribution as a norm and to evaluate various theories of urban size distribution.  This paper, however, is
not concerned with testing stochastic processes that generate particular size distributions or with central
place theory.
2
It, instead, is concerned with the size of the largest city compared with other cities.  From an
economic perspective, a city is too large if it reduces economic welfare.  Although a large literature exists
that suggests that large cities in developing countries are too large in this sense, the evidence, except for
Ades and Glaeser (1995), who find that large main cities may inhibit growth, is not systematic.  Moomaw
and Shatter (1993) find urban concentration works both ways:  a greater share of a country’s population in
cities of 250,000 or more population increases growth, but the share in the largest city decreases growth.
This result may suggest that it is the size of the largest city compared with other cities--primacy--rather
than absolute size that adversely affects economic performance.  If the relative size of large cities does not4
result from economic forces, it is plausible that they are too large from an economic perspective.
Consequently, a failure to find economic determinants of urban primacy would place the burden of proof on
people who contend that it is not excessive.  Finding economic determinants, of course, does not
demonstrate that primacy is not excessive; it may, however, change the presumption.
In this paper, we measure primacy, the dependent variable, using different primacy ratios.  Our
first measure of primacy, PRIMACY1-2, is the ratio of the population of the largest city to that of the
second largest city, where cities are defined as urban agglomerations.  In recognition of countries where the
two largest cities are of about the same size--biprimate countries--we also construct two other measures.
PRIMACY1-4 is the ratio of the population of the largest city to that of the sum of the populations of the
second through fourth largest cities.  The third measure is PRIMACY2-2, which is the ratio of the sum of
the population of the two largest cities to that of the third and fourth largest cities.  The latter variable
reduces the emphasis on the largest city, which we believe makes PRIMACY1-2 and PRIMACY1-4
preferred measures.
Before discussing the pragmatic reason for using these primacy measures and the choice of
countries, a brief discussion of the basic model is appropriate.  We hypothesize that an economic model of
urban primacy implies that the economic size of a country is negatively associated with primacy.  This
testable hypothesis is crucial to our approach.  The tradeoff between benefits due to agglomeration (or
concentration) and costs due to distance (transportation costs) implies that three components of a country’s
size--output, population, and land area--are relevant. Therefore, the model including GDP, population
(POP) and arable land area (LAND), is
lnPRIMACY = ln a +b lnPOP + c lnLAND + d lnGDP + (other variables, parameters, and an
error term (1).
  An increase in size, by our definition, is a joint proportional increase in GDP, population, and land
area.  As the economic size of a nation increases, it enables several production sites, creating new urban
centers, and, thus, reducing urban primacy.
3  The failure to find such a relationship would, we believe,
discredit an economic approach to explaining urban primacy, suggesting that other explanations would be
more powerful.5
A problem arises because unmeasurable variables, such as geography, history, institutions, and
politics, vary substantially over the cross section, but vary slowly, if at all, over time. The cross-sectional
variation in these variables affects both agglomeration benefits and transportation costs, and thus affects
the relationship between primacy and economic variables. The a priori importance of these unmeasurable
variables implies that if they are omitted, as they must be in pure cross-section analysis, regression
coefficients may suffer serious bias.   As Carroll (1982) says, if unobserved, confounding variables vary
over a cross-section, a time series analysis may be more appropriate. The contradictory findings of various
cross section studies, e.g., El-Shaks (1972) and Sheppard (1982), may be due to the failure to control these
important variables.
The confounding effects of unmeasurable variables in a cross section can be reduced or eliminated
by using panel data and the fixed-effects estimator (Green, 1997).  The unmeasured variables are controlled
with dummy variables for each country--fixed effects.  Within country variation over time then permits the
calculation of the effects of various independent variables on the dependent variable, primacy. As Green
(1997) discusses, to precisely estimate parameters that are identified by time-series variation, a long time
series is important.  Consequently, we decided to use data in five-year increments, beginning in 1960 and
extending to 1990.  This data requirement makes it very costly to use summary measures of the size
distribution that require more than just a few of a country’s largest cities.  Obtaining individual city
population data necessary to calculate summary measures of the size distribution for a set of developed and
developing countries every five years would be a formidable research task.  Thus, the cost of obtaining
size-distribution data provides a pragmatic reason for using the primacy ratios rather than summary
measures based on a large number of cities.
4
We limited our sample to countries from Asia (excluding Middle East) and the Americas for
several reasons.  Most important, competing explanations of the sources of urban primacy have been
applied to these countries.  The effects of economic, political, and foreign factors on primacy, if they exist
anywhere, should exist in the sample because of its large variation.  Asia and Latin America include several
countries that have had rapid economic growth, and several countries that have not.  Moreover, the World
Bank (1993) argues that openness to foreign influence is an important reason for Southeast Asian6
development.  Other Asian countries, such as India, have been more inward looking.  Just as with economic
variation, political factors vary substantially in the sample. Finally, both dependency theory and world-
systems theory have been used to analyze economic development in South America and Asia.
Besides being appropriate parts of the world for examining the competing explanations, these
countries comprise many of the countries in which urban concentration is a critical issue.  Rapid
urbanization and mega-cities exist in the sample.  For instance, 13 of the 16 largest agglomerations
(population of 10 million or more) in the world in 1995 are in countries in the sample.
5  According to
World Bank data, rapid urbanization exists in the sample, particularly in Asia and Latin America.  Rapid
urbanization is important because the estimates below do not attempt to estimate lags; consequently, they
assume that the primacy ratios are equilibrium ratios.
6  Because forces attracting urban residents
differentially to the largest or the next-to-largest cities would be more likely to do so quickly in a rapid
growth situation, the assumption may be better supported in periods of rapid urban growth.
The countries from Asia and the Americas in the sample were chosen systematically, meeting three
conditions; they (1) had a total population of two million or more in 1990, (2) were a nation-state not a
city-state, eliminating Hong Kong and Singapore, and (3) were not a socialist or ex-socialist country.
 These criteria give 33 countries.  Because of substantial data unavailability, we drop Haiti, Jamaica, and
Nepal, leaving the thirty countries--11 from Asia, 17 from Latin America, and 2 from North America--
listed in the Appendix.
Two possible criticisms of limiting the sample are that the sample does not contain enough degrees
of freedom or enough variation to estimate the proposed relationships and that the results might not be
representative of the entire nonsocialist world.  In response, we first note that by combining time-series and
cross-section data for 7 years and 30 countries we have 210 observations, which provides adequate degrees
of freedom.  The fixed effects estimation implies that a parameter is estimated for each country, resulting in
some panel estimations having about 165 degrees of freedom. Second, the sample exhibits large variation.
(See Table 1 for means, standard deviations, and ranges for the data.)  Population in India, for instance, is
INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE7
about 850 million (1990) in contrast to about 2.5 million in Panama.  The largest main cities in the sample,
such as Tokyo with more than 25 million inhabitants, dwarf the smaller main cities, such as San Jose
(capital of Costa Rica) with 297 thousand inhabitants.  Development is another variable with wide
variation; in 1990, GDP per capita in India, for instance, was $1,264 in (PPP) compared with $18,054 in
the United States.  Primacy also has a large variation. Some countries have extreme primacy, for instance
Thailand (Bangkok is 26 times larger than the second largest city); others have low urban primacy, such as
Canada (the largest city is only 20 percent larger than the second city).  Consequently, neither degrees of
freedom nor sample variation constrains the results for the countries in the sample.  Nevertheless, use of the
fixed-effects, panel-data estimator makes us reluctant to generalize outside the sample.  We believe,
however, that results for countries that account for most of the world’s largest cities, for many of the
countries where primacy is an issue, and for the continents of (noncommunist) Asia, South and North
America have intrinsic interest.
III. An Econometric Model of Urban Primacy
Equation 1 provides the essence of the model to be estimated--a negative association between size
and primacy.  Notice, however, that the definition of a size increase--a proportional increase in GDP,
population, and arable land area--implies GDP per capita and population density do not change when size
increases.  Consequently, the effects of GDP per capita and population density on primacy can be tested
holding constant the effects of size.  Through algebraic manipulation Equation (1) becomes
LnPRIMACY = ln a +c ln (POP/LAND) + (-b-c) ln (GDP/POP) + (d + b + c) GDP + (other
terms) (2).
In this equation the coefficient of GDP per capita (GDP/POP) gives the effect of development on primacy,
and the coefficient of GDP gives the effect of size on primacy.  Unlike in most studies, the specification
used here permits a straightforward distinction between the effects of development and size.  The
hypothesis regarding development and primacy requires a brief repetition.  As an economy develops and
moves away from agriculture, internal and external economies of scale dictate increases in urbanization and
perhaps a geographical concentration of economic activity.  As development starts, it may be more efficient
to concentrate infrastructure and investment in one place to exploit agglomeration economies, reduce8
transportation costs, and have a focal point for manufacturing and commerce. As output per capita
increases, the demand for services provided only by the central place may increase--services for which
economies of scale are important relative to the demand for them--increasing the importance of the largest
city.  As development proceeds, urban primacy and development are hypothesized to be positively
associated (e.g., Alonso 1980 and El-Shakhs 1972).  Their hypothesis further suggests that eventually
primacy or other measures of concentration will decrease with development, as economic activity spreads
to other cities and rural areas.  The evidence for the hypothesized relation between development and
primacy, going back to Berry (1961) and as summarized by Carroll (1982), Gilbert and Gugler (1992), and
Sheppard (1982), is inconclusive.  We provide an additional test of this bell-shaped relationship between
primacy and development by including GDP per capita squared in some models.
  In addition, we assume that interurban transportation cost and population density are negatively
related.  When population density decreases, transportation cost increases, putting a premium on large
concentrations of economic activity.  Consequently, population density is a proxy for transportation cost
and is expected to have a negative coefficient.  The hypothesis is that higher population density--lower
interurban transportation cost--has a negative effect on primacy.
Another aspect of development that may affect primacy is industrialization.  Ades and Glaeser
(1995) suggest that an agricultural economy with its ties to geographical resources is apt to be more
dispersed and that the shared use of infrastructure by industry is apt to lead to greater urban concentration
in an industrialized economy.  In their view, industrialization increases primacy.  In contrast, Carroll
(1982) reports that others have suggested that an agricultural economy is apt to have more urban primacy
and an industrialized economy less primacy because the industrialized economy will have more urban
interconnections and networks.  We test these hypotheses using the percentage of employment outside
agriculture to measure industrialization.
Finally, in many countries, the largest city is the capital city.  Public administration and
government offices increase the employment in the largest city, and thus may increase the total population
of the largest city.  In addition, rent-seeking activities may make the capital city larger than it would
otherwise be (Benson and Faminow 1988).  In Southeast Asia, the capital and primate city emerged in the9
19
th century both as the city through which resources were shipped from the interior to Europe and as the
colonial administrative city.  With independence these cities became the countries’ capitals.  The inclusion
of a capital city indicator captures the effect of changing to a new capital in the study period.  The country
fixed effects captures the effect of past colonial status. Although we do not measure it directly we do
control these important historical forces.  They are, however, captured by the country fixed effects.  Thus,
if significant, a positive coefficient would suggest that countries such as Brazil (in the sample period) and
the United States (much earlier) that have created new capitals have probably decreased primacy.
In short, in our simplest model, urban primacy depends upon size (gross domestic product,
population, and land area), economic development (GDP per capita), population density, industrialization,
and whether the largest city is the capital city.
Basic equation:
We specify two equivalent equations for urban primacy,
LPRIMACY = a +b LPOP + c LGDP + d LLAND + e   LINDUST + f DCAP + v  (3)
LPRIMACY = a + g LPOPLAND + h LGDP + i  LGDPC + e  LINDUST +
f  DCAP + v  (4)
where,
LPRIMACY =  the natural logarithm of one of three primacy indices: PRIMACY1-2, the ratio of the
largest city’s population to that of the next largest city, or PRIMACY1-4, the ratio of the
largest city’s population to that of the sum of the next three cities’ populations, or
PRIMACY2-2, the ratio of the sum of the two largest cities’ populations to that of the next
two largest cities.
LPOP =  the natural logarithm of a country’s population.
LGDP =  the natural logarithm of gross domestic product.
LLAND =  the natural logarithm of a country’s arable land area.
LINDUST =  the natural logarithm of a country’s nonagricultural employment as a proportion of total
employment.
DCAP =  a dummy variable equals one if the capital city is the largest city in a country, and equals10
zero otherwise.
LPOPLAND =  the natural logarithm of population density which is a country’s population divided by
arable land area.
LGDPC =  the natural logarithm of gross domestic product divided by population
LGDPCSQ =    (LGDPC)
 2, which is added to equation (4) to test the bell-shaped hypothesis.
a - i are coefficients, and v is an error term assumed to have classical properties.
All variables are for country i at time t.
The equation is estimated with dummy variables for each country, because a country’s
urbanization pattern may be situation specific.  As Henderson puts it,”the impact of trade on national space
is situation specific, depending upon the precise geography of the country” (Henderson 1996, p. 33). Just
as with trade, we believe that the urbanization response of a country to GDP per capita, population density,
and GDP may be idiosyncratic, depending upon history, including colonial history, geography, and other
aspects of a country that do not change over time.  Rather than saying that these influences are unimportant
as might be inferred from their omission in a pure time-series study or as is implied in cross-section studies
that do not include such variables, the panel approach takes them very seriously and controls them with
country fixed effects.
7  Although the idiosyncrasies may be difficult or impossible to measure, to ignore
them in a cross-section regression is to risk omitted-variable bias.  We therefore use country effects to
control variables that are situation specific.
Spatial correlation is an econometric problem that arises with cross-sectional spatial data.
Following Kelejian and Robinson (1997) and Rickman and Partridge (1997), we test for spatial correlation
of the error term vi t   by assuming that the error term has two components: one that spills over to other
countries and one that is contained within the country.  The Kelejian-Robinson test is a test of the null
hypothesis of no spatial correlation.  The null is not rejected if the t-statistic in the appropriate test is less
than 1.65. In model 1 in both Tables 2 and 3 below, the t-statistic is 1.09 and 0.98.  (Results were similar
for other models).  Thus, this test reveals no problem with spatial correlation.
Estimates
The least squares estimates (with country dummy variables) of equation (3) for each primacy11
measure, PRIMACY1-2, PRIMACY1-4, and PRIMACY2-2, are shown in the first 3 columns of Table 2.
The elasticity of primacy with respect to population is negative and significant in all equations.   For the
PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
ratio of the populations of the first and second largest cities, PRIMACY1-2, it is -0.63; for comparison, it
is -0.74 for PRIMACY1-4 and -0.56 for PRIMACY2-2.  The point estimates for the elasticity with respect
to GDP are 0.11, 0.14. and 0.11, but significant with a two-tailed test only for the PRIMACY1-4 equation.
Furthermore, the estimates of the elasticity with respect to land are 0.07, 0.17, and 0.19, but significant (at
0.10) only for the PRIMACY1-4 equation.
8  For this sample of countries, an increase in population reduces
urban primacy, and, although not generally significant at conventional levels, increases in GDP and land
area increase it.  Furthermore, a one percent increase in both population and GDP, which increases both
densities because land area is held constant, reduces primacy by from 0.5 to 0.6 percent (the sum of the
population and GDP coefficients).  This is a result consistent with the underlying economic approach
because it states that a joint increase in population density and GDP density reduces primacy. The greater
population density lets firms locate closer to their markets, while the greater GDP density allows firms to
realize economies of scale at more locations because of the greater demand density.
The equivalent estimates of equation (4)—the equivalence is demonstrated in our previous
discussion of equations (3) and (4)—in columns 4-6 help in interpretation by providing an estimate of the
effect of an increase in development—GDP per capita— holding GDP and population density constant.
This thought experiment is conducted by reducing population and land area by the same proportion, which
implies an increase in GDP per capita. As the coefficients of GDP per capita (0.56, 0.57, and 0.37) show,
increased development leads to an increase in primacy in the three estimates.  This positive association
between primacy and development is consistent with the hypothesis in the literature, regarding the initial
effect of development on primacy.  (We examine the bell shape later.)
The pure size hypothesis implies that same proportional increase in GDP, population, and land
area reduces primacy.  With this thought experiment, GDP increases, but GDP per capita, population
density, and other variables in the model are unchanged.  The coefficients of GDP in columns 4-6 test the
size hypothesis.  They are negative and significant, further supporting the economic approach.12
The two remaining sets of coefficients in columns 1-6 are those of the capital city indicator and the
industrialization measure (the share of nonagricultural employment); these are identical in the two sets of
equations, as shown algebraically in equations 3 and 4. The coefficients indicate that primacy increases as
the nonagricultural (industrial) share of the economy increases, and is greater if the largest city is also the
capital city.  Note, however, that industrialization is significant only for PRIMACY1-2 and PRIMACY1-4,
showing that the effect exists for the largest city relative to the next largest cities, but not for the largest two
cities relative to the next largest cities.
In columns 7-9 we test for the bell-shaped relationship between primacy and development by
including the square of the logarithm of GDP per capita.  As Table 2 shows, the coefficient of the squared
variable is small and insignificant.  The correlations between and among it, GDP per capita, and
industrialization probably explain why the coefficient of GDP per capita becomes insignificant.  Other
coefficients are essentially unaffected.  This set of regressions provides no support for the bell-shaped
relationship between primacy and development.
  The results in this section support the proposed simple economic model of primacy.  Primacy
responds to economic forces in a systematic and reasonable way.  Furthermore, the results for
industrialization are consistent with the hypotheses suggested by Ades and Glaeser (1995).   Finally, the
capital-city result is consistent with the idea that political forces affect urbanization patterns.  In the next
section, we briefly present and test several additional hypotheses, including political ones, regarding urban
primacy.  We take the economic model as the base and expand it.  
IV. Alternative Explanations of Urban Primacy
Social scientists--economists, geographers, political scientists, and sociologists--have offered
additional explanations of urban primacy, which focus on international economic relations, internal
political factors, and demographic factors.  Krugman (1996) has developed models that imply that primacy
decreases with the openness of a national economy.  In contrast, dependency theory implies that economies,
particularly developing economies, that are more open to foreign trade, will experience increased primacy
because (dependent) trade concentrates production in the larger cities.  According to Castells, dependent
urbanization, which implies that developing countries rely on industrialized countries for trade, investment,13
aid, and technology transfer, ”causes a superconcentration in the urban areas” (primate cities) (Castells
1977, 47-48).  In the extended model, openness (dependency) is measured by the logarithm of the
export/GDP ratio.  Krugman’s model predicts a negative sign, but dependency theory predicts a positive
sign.  World-systems theory has similar implications.  It divides nations into core, semiperiphery, and
periphery, with the core countries exploiting the periphery and to a lesser extent the semiperiphery,
resulting in uneven development and uneven urbanization.  It asserts that peripheral and semiperipheral
nations have higher levels of urban primacy than core nations.  London (1987), London and Smith (1990),
and Lyman (1992) present empirical evidence in support of the theory.
Internal political forces are expected to result in urban primacy in developing countries, according
to the theory of urban bias, as developed by Lipton (1977).  A variable used by London and Bradshaw (and
others) to proxy for urban bias is itself a proxy for the ratio of nonagricultural to agricultural productivity.
The proxy for nonagricultural productivity is the nonagricultural output as a percent of GDP divided by
nonagricultural employment as a percent of total employment.  Agricultural productivity is proxied in a
corresponding way.  Urban disparity, the logarithm of nonagricultural to agricultural productivity, is
assumed to increase with urban bias.  The assumption is that large investments (public and private) in large
urban areas and neglected investment opportunities in rural areas cause increases in nonagricultural
productivity relative to agricultural productivity and promote urban primacy.   
Others, however, have implied that an urban political bias may increase primacy in some
developing countries and not others, depending upon internal political forces.   Benson and Faminow
(1988) have suggested that rent seeking is more effective in the capital, which is often the largest city.
Although Gilbert and Gugler do not use rent-seeking terminology, they argue ”In many countries  . . . it is
the location of government and the paraphernalia of modernization rather than industrial growth per se that
is the principal source of urban and regional concentration” (Gilbert and Gugler 1992, 56).
As mentioned earlier, Bairoch states that excessive urbanization has resulted in an excessively
large proportion of the urban population living in very large cities. Although this might suggest that the
greater the percent urban the greater the primacy, Richardson and Schwartz (1988) argue the opposite.
They suggest that a higher urban percentage implies that cities other than the primate city can develop and14
attract population from it.  They imply that primacy is largely a demographic phenomenon, resulting from
small national populations and low degrees of urbanization.  Because population is in the basic model, the
only new variable needed to test this is the logarithm of urbanized population.
Furthermore, a more educated population and large cities interact positively (Henderson 1988;
Rauch 1993).  More educated and skilled people may opt for jobs and services that are not available in
smaller cities and towns.  With a higher proportion of such people in the economy, the preference for living
in large cities may be greater.  As a result, any premium necessary to attract people to large cities will be
less and large cities will be more profitable locations.  Moreover, this concentration of human capital in
large cities may have external effects (Rauch 1993) that increase the productivity and thus size of the
largest cities.  Our variable is the logarithm of the country’s average years of education of people more
than 25 years of age.
Another factor that may be related to primacy is the degree of political freedom.  Strong,
undemocratic political leaders may concentrate power in administrative centers, particularly the largest
city, to serve the interests of the military, political, and economic elite, much as the colonial powers
concentrated resources in the primate city.  These undemocratic leaders have greater ability to ignore the
wishes of the politically weak hinterland--smaller cities and rural areas (Ades and Glaeser 1995).    We use
the Gastil classification of countries as free, partially free, and not free as a political freedom indicator:
depending upon the category, countries are assigned the number 1, 2, or 3 (3 is not free).
It is not our purpose to discuss these theories and empirical studies in depth.  Instead we take the
variables suggested by the proponents of the various theories and add them to equations (3) and (4).  The
intent is to see if these variables are significant, which would provide support for the underlying theories,
and to decide if their addition affects or eliminates the relationship between primacy and economic factors
reported in the previous section.  (We use the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP and dummy
variables to directly test dependency and world-system theories in the next section)
The relationships between primacy and development and primacy and size in the estimates in Table
3 are stronger than in Table 2.  The coefficients of GDP and GDP per capita in columns 4-6 are larger
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 (in absolute value) and have larger t-statistics than the corresponding coefficients in Table 2.  The
coefficient of population density is also larger and more precisely measured; in two of the estimates,
however, it is significant only at 0.10.    In short, the expanded model provides greater support for the basic
economic approach to primacy.
Compared to Table 2, the coefficient of the capital city indicator falls in absolute value in all
equations in Table 3; it retains significance, however, as long as the largest city is the only city used for the
dependent variables (PRIMACY1-2 and PRIMACY1-4).  This reduction in size suggests that some of the
capital-city effect in Table 2 is captured by the variables added in Table 3.   As might be expected, the
addition of variables associated with development, e.g., education and urbanized population, apparently
reduce the size and significance of the coefficients of industrialization.   Its coefficient retains significance
for the two-city primacy ratio (0.10), but not for the four-city ratio.
As in Table 2, the coefficient of GDP per capita squared is not significant in this set of equations.
(The results are not tabulated here, but are available upon request).  Its addition affects the coefficients of
population density and, naturally, of GDP per capita.  Nevertheless, it has almost no impact on the
coefficients of GDP or the capital city indicator.  Similarly, the results for the additional variables in this
model (discussed below) are not sensitive to the addition of LGDPCSQ.  Thus, neither Table 2 nor Table
3's results support the bell-shaped relationship between primacy and development.
The variables added in Table 3 are the logarithm of exports as a share of GDP as a measure of the
openness of the national economy, the logarithm of nonagricultural relative to agricultural productivity as a
measure of urban bias, the logarithm of the total urbanized population as a demographic control, the
logarithm of the average years of education, and the indicator variable for political freedom.   (Recall that
the coefficients of these variables are identical for the two sets of equations (Columns 1-3 and 4-6).)
The competing hypotheses about the effects of openness do not fare well in Table 3.  Although the
coefficients of export’s share are negative, they are not precisely estimated.  The strongest result is for the
two-city primacy ratio, but even there the coefficient is only slightly larger than its standard error.  Thus,
these results do not support Krugman’s openness hypothesis nor do they support dependency theory.
In contrast, the urban bias variable has a significant coefficient, but its sign suggests that the16
proposed measure of bias is associated with less rather than more primacy.  This result is consistent for all
the estimates.  If internal policies enhance nonagricultural productivity and increase urbanization, their
effect is not to increase primacy.  Instead, if these policies exist, they favor smaller cities relative to the
primate and second city.  Consequently, using its proponents’ measure of bias, there is no support for the
hypothesis that "urban bias" is source of primacy.
An increase in the urbanized population, however, has a positive effect on primacy, in contrast to
Richardson and Schwartz’s hypothesis.  This finding provides mixed support for Ingram’s (1998) position
that large cities in large developing countries grow at the same or slower rate than the urban population.
Our result says that an increase in the urbanized population, holding total population constant, increases
the size of the largest city relative to the next largest cities and the size of the two largest cities relative to
the next two largest cities.  The absolute value of the negative coefficient of population for the two-city
ratio (-1.33) is more than four times as large as the coefficient of urbanized population (0.30).  This implies
that so long as the urbanized population grows no faster than about four times faster than the total
population, primacy will not increase.  Thus, Ingram’s position is consistent with our results because we
expect the effect of total population on primacy to more than offset the effect of urbanized population.
The education coefficients suggest that higher levels of education are associated with greater
primacy using the two- and four-city primacy ratios but not with the biprimacy ratio.  The pattern of the
coefficients and their significance suggests that education increases the size of the largest city relative to the
second and the second through fourth cities.
Finally, the results are consistent with the idea that political freedom is associated with a decrease
in the two-city primacy ratio, but not in the other ratios.  The coefficient of the measure of political freedom
for PRIMACY1-2 in Table 3 is significant and positive.  The combined results suggest that more
dictatorial regimes suppress the second largest city, but do little to affect the other primacy ratios.  
At this point, the paper provides little support for the theories that urban primacy varies
systematically with international economic relations or that urban bias causes primacy in developing
countries.  Indeed, the evidence regarding development suggests that primacy increases with economic
development, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that it is characteristic of the least developed17
countries. Evidence is presented, however, that more dictatorial regimes are associated with greater
primacy and that increases in urbanization can lead to greater primacy.
Nevertheless, international relations as they affect primacy may change slowly.  Consequently, they
may be measured better as an average over the period rather than as changing every five years.  The
perception of, as well as the actuality of, trade policy, the behavior of foreign investors, rent seeking and so
on might affect location decisions, suggesting that a measure of these factors averaged over a longer time
period might be more appropriate.  In the next section, we associate average measures of these factors with
the estimated fixed effects; the purpose is to provide additional tests of the alternative explanations.
V Further Tests of Competing Explanations
In this section we provide further tests of world-systems theory, the effect of international trade and
the effects of political factors on primacy.   With a country specific effect for each country, we have
primacy differentials for a cross section of 30 observations.  These differentials, in effect, are holding the
variables in Table 3 constant (except for export’s share).
9  We test the world-systems hypothesis, the
openness vs. dependency hypothesis, and the political hypotheses sequentially.
 To test world-systems theory, we rely on Lyman’s (1990) study of the relationship between world
systems and primacy to allocate countries to the appropriate part of the world system.  A country can be in
the periphery, the semiperiphery, or the core.  (We arbitrarily placed Bangladesh and the Dominican
Republic in the periphery and Taiwan in the semiperiphery; Lyman did not include these countries.)  As
another measure of world systems ideas or of openness versus dependency, we use an average of the ratio
of foreign direct investment to GDP from 1960 to 1990. (In this analysis we have foreign direct investment
for the 30 countries but not for every year for every country; so for a few countries the average is over a
subset of the period.)  Finally, to test Krugman’s openness hypothesis vs. dependency theory, we use an
average of the ratio of exports to GDP from 1960 to 1990.
The existence of a centralized rather than a federated national government has been shown to be
associated with increased urban concentration.  Presumably, in a federal system the subnational units will
use political influence to enhance the size of their capitals (Henderson 1988), decreasing the influence of
the national capital.  Another political variable that we use is Mauro’s (1995) index of bureaucratic18
efficiency as a measure of the opportunity for rent seeking.  This index is derived from the Business
International (BI) part of the Economist Intelligence Unit.  It is the average of BI’s subjective ranking of the
judiciary system, red tape, and corruption indices that Mauro considers (1995, 686)”a more precise
measure of corruption than the corruption index on its own.”   This index is an average over 1980 to 1983,
ranges from 1 to 10, and is available for only 24 countries in our sample.
We regress primacy differences on position in the world system, importance of foreign direct
investment, importance of exports, the existence of a centralized national government and the degree of
bureaucratic efficiency.  We believe that world-systems theory requires a positive coefficient on peripheral
location that is larger than the expected positive coefficient on semiperipheral location.  World-systems
theory and dependency theory require a positive coefficient on both the foreign direct investment and export
shares, whereas the economic theory regarding openness requires a negative coefficient on the export share.
Finally, the political theories call for a positive coefficient for a central national government and a negative
coefficient on bureaucratic efficiency.
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In the first column of Table 4 we show a regression of primacy differentials on location in the
world system for the 30 countries.  Although both coefficients are positive, the coefficient on the
semiperipheral location is larger.  Column 4 gives the same estimate for sample of 24 countries for which
we have bureaucratic efficiency data.  (We include the estimates in columns 4 and 5 so that examine the
effects of adding the bureaucratic efficiency without concern for the fact that 6 countries must be dropped
to do so) The coefficients and significance levels are similar to those in column 1.  In columns 2 and 5 we
add the importance of exports and the existence of a centralized government to the model.  The coefficients
of the export variable are negative and highly significant in both samples, but the coefficients of the
centralized government variable are insignificant in these and subsequent estimates.  Controlling export
share and centralized government, however, increases the size and precision of the coefficients of the world
systems variables. The coefficients of the semiperiphery indicator attain significance at 0.10 and remain
larger than those of the periphery indicator.  The addition of the foreign direct investment share (column 3)
to the model in column 2 leaves the estimate essentially unchanged.
Addition of the variable that measures the opportunity for rent seeking, bureaucratic efficiency,19
makes an important difference (columns 6 and 7).  Greater bureaucratic efficiency is associated with less
primacy, and the addition of the variable wipes out the emerging significance of the world system variables.
Bureaucratic efficiency and the importance of exports are highly significant in all equations.   Results (not
reported here, but available upon request) are essentially the same if the primacy differential is measured
using the estimates based on the four-city primacy ratio or the biprimate ratio.
The results in Section II support a model of urban primacy that relies on economic factors.  In
addition, they support a political role in primacy because countries whose largest city is also the capital
have greater primacy.   In Section III measures of the importance of exports, urban bias, the urbanized
population, education, and political freedom are added to the basic model.  These estimates are stronger for
the basic economic model and show that education, the urbanization of the population, and lack of political
freedom are positively associated with primacy, but there is no evidence of urban bias or of an effect of
exports on primacy.  In this section, we find that openness to exports is associated with less primacy, but
that the potential for political corruption (the inverse of bureaucratic efficiency) is associated with
enhanced primacy.  After accounting for such factors as political freedom, education, possible corruption,
and other variables we find no evidence that current external political forces, as summarized in world
system and dependency theories, are associated with greater primacy.  This finding does not imply that past
international relations, particularly colonialism, did and do not affect primacy; such past events are
controlled by the fixed effects.
VI. Conclusions
Primacy is an important phenomenon.  Although huge cities result from demographic and economic
considerations, it is sometimes argued that excessive primacy is inherent in low-income countries because
of urban bias, dependent urbanization, and/or world systems considerations.  Our results suggest that there
can be an urban political bias, but that this bias is not an integral part of underdevelopment.  As more data
become available, it will be interesting to determine if these results hold for Africa.  Because nothing in the
analysis is particularly tailored to development status in South America and Asia, it is probable that these
results will extend to Africa.  Similarly, the basic economic model relying on centralizing and
decentralizing forces as they are reflected in size variables— population, land area, and GDP—should play
similar roles in other countries.  The remaining results, dealing with industrialization, government structure,20
and so on may be unique to the sample.
 If primacy were not a result of economic and demographic considerations, there would be good
reason to believe that it has an adverse effect on development.  The costs of large cities, however, must be
balanced against the benefits.  If, as we find, much primacy can be explained by economic and
demographic considerations, there is no longer prima facie evidence that extremely large cities are parasitic.
This paper’s fundamental conclusion is that straightforward economic considerations related to economies
of scale and transportation cost are the major determinants of primacy.  World systems theory, dependency
theory, and theories of urban bias are not necessary to explain observed primacy.
Because of the increasing vehemence in the popular debate about globalization, the results
regarding dependency, world systems, and the degree of openness—globalization's effect on primacy, if you
like—are becoming increasingly relevant.  Although we find no evidence that globalization increases
primacy, our finding that openness reduces primacy only shows up in one approach.  We believe that these
results are important enough to call for additional research on the interrelationships between primacy and
international policies...
Larger countries--GDP, population, and land area--and countries with greater density of GDP and
greater density of population per unit of land have less primacy.  These results are consistent with
expectations from simple economic models of urban structure.  Primacy increases with GDP per capita at a
decreasing rate.  The point estimates suggest that this relationship is positive over observed ranges of GDP
per capita. This indication that primacy increases with development may be a reflection of the increasing
demand for services with higher income and the provision of these higher-level services by the central
place.   It may also reflect the interrelationships between education, productivity, and large cities.21
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ades, A. F. and E. L. Glaeser (1995),”Trade and Circuses:  Explaining Urban Giants,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 110,195-227.
Alonso, W. (1980),”Five Bell Shapes in Development,” Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science
Association, 45, 5-16.
Alwosabi, M. (1995), The Impact of Economic, Political, and International Factors on Urban Primacy,
PhD Dissertation, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK.
Alperovitch, G. (1992),”Economic Development and Population Concentration,” Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 4, 63 -74.
Bairoch, P. (1988), Cities and Economic Development: From the Dawn of History to The Present,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Barro, R. J. and Lee (1993),”International Comparisons of Educational Attainment,” Journal of Monetary
Economics; 32, 363-94.
Bates, R. (1981), Markets and States in Black Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies,
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Bradshaw, Y. (1987),”Urbanization and Underdevelopment: A Global Study of Modernization, Urban
Bias, and Economic Dependency,” American Sociological Review, 52, 224- 239.
Benson, B. and M.D. Faminow (1988),”Location Choice and Urban Growth in a Rent-Seeking Society,”
Public Finance Quarterly, 16, 158-178.
Berry, B. (1961, July),”City Size Distributions and Economic Development,” Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 9 (4), 573-587.
Brueckner, J. K. (1990, April),”Analyzing Third World Urbanization: A Model with Empirical Evidence,”
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38(3), 587-610.
Carroll, G. R. (1982, March),”National City-size Distributions: What Do We Know after 67
                   Years of Research?” Progress in Human Geography, 6 (1),
Castells, M. (1977), The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach, Cambridge:  MIT Press.
Davis, K. (1969), World Urbanization 1950-1970, 1, Berkeley: University of California.
Davis, K. and H. Golden (1954),”Urbanization and Development of Preindustrial Areas,” Economic
Development and Cultural Change, 3 (1), 6-24.
El-Shakhs, S. (1972, October), Development, Primacy, and Systems of Cities,” The Journal of Developing
Areas, 7, 11-36.
Frank, A. G. (1966), The Development of Underdevelopment, New York:  Monthly Review Press.
Frey, R. S., T. Dietz, and J. Marte (1986),”The Effect of Economic Dependence on Urban Primacy: a
Cross-National Panel Analysis,” Urban Affairs Quarterly, 21, 359-368.
Gastil, R., Freedom in the World, Westport:  Greenwood Press (different years).
Gilbert, A. G. and J. Gugler (1992), Cities, Poverty, and Development: Urbanization in the Third World,22
New York: Oxford University Press.
Greene, W. (1997), Econometric Analysis: 3rd edition, New York: Macmillan.
Henderson, J. V. (1988), Urban Development:  Theory, Fact, and Illusion, Oxford:  Oxford University
Press.
Henderson, J. V. (1996),”Ways to Think about Urban Concentration: Neoclassical Urban Systems versus
the New Economic Geography.” International Regional Science Review, 19, 31-36.
Ingram, G. K. (1998),”Patterns of Metropolitan Development:  What Have We Learned?”
Urban Studies, 35, 1019-35.
Jefferson, M. (1939, April),”The Law of the Primate City,” Geographical Review, 29, 226-232.
Kelejian, H. H. and D.P.Robinson, (1997), "Infrastructure Productivity Estimation and Its Underlying
Econometric Specifications: A Sensitivity Analysis," Papers in Regional Science, 76(1), 115-31.
Krugman, P. (1996),”Urban Concentration: The Role of Increasing Returns and Transportation Costs,”
International Regional Science Review, 19, 5-30.
Krugman, P. and Elizondo, R.L. (1996),”Trade Policy and the Third World Metropolis, “Journal of
Development Economics 49 (1), 137-50.
Kennedy, P. (1992), A Guide to Econometrics: Third Edition, Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press.
Lipton, M. (1977), Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
London, B. (1987),”Structural Determinants of Third World Urban Change: An Ecological and Political
Economic Analysis,” American Sociological Review, 52, 28-43.
London, B. and D. Smith (1988),”Urban Bias, Dependence, and Economic Stagnation in Non-core
Nations,” American Sociological Review, 53, 454 - 463.
Lyman, B. (1992, September),”Urban Primacy and World-System Position,” Urban Affairs Quarterly,
28(1), 22-37.
Mauro, P. (1995),”Corruption And Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3): 681 - 712.
Mills, E. S. and B. W. Hamilton (1994), Urban Economics, 5
th ed., New York: HarperCollins College
Publishers.
Moomaw, R. L. and A. M. Shatter (1996),”Urbanization and Economic Development:  A Bias Toward
Large Cities?” Journal of Urban Economics
Moomaw, R. L. and A. M. Shatter (1993, Fall),”Urbanization as a Factor in Economic Growth:  An
Empirical Study,” Journal of Economics, 19 (2), 1- 6.
Mulligan, G. (1984),”Agglomeration and Central Place Theory: A Review of the Literature,” International
Regional Science Review, 9 (1), 1-42.
Mutlu, S. (1989),”Urban Concentration and Policy Revisited: An Analysis and Some Policy Conclusions,”
Economic Development and Cultural Change,” 37 (3), 611-39.23
Partridge, M.D. and D.S.Rickman (1997), "The Dispersion of US State Unemployment Rates:  The Role of
Market and Non-Market Equilibrium Factors," Regional Studies 31 (6), 593-606.
 Rauch, J. E. (1993),”Productivity Gains from Geographic Concentration of Human Capital:  Evidence
from the Cities,” Journal of Urban Economics, 34, 380-400.
Rosen, K. T. and M. Resnick (1980),”The Size Distribution of Cities:  An Examination of the Pareto Law
and Primacy,” Journal of Urban Economics, 8, 165-186.
Shatter, A. M. (1992), The Relationship between Urbanization and Economic Development, PhD
Dissertation, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK.
Sheppard, E. (1982),”City Size Distributions and Spatial Economic Change,” International Regional
Science Review, 7 (2), 127-151.
Smith, D. and B. London (1990),”Convergence in World Urbanization? A Quantitative Assessment,”
Urban Affairs Quarterly, 25 (4): 574 - 590.
The Europe World Yearbook (1926-   ), London:  Europe Publications Ltd.
United Nations (1984), Population Distribution, Migration, and Development, New York:  UNDIESA.
United Nations (1991b), World Urbanization Prospects:  The 1990 Revision, New York: UN Department
of International Economics and Social Affairs.
United Nations (1993), World Urbanization Prospects:  The 1992 Revision, New York:  UN Department of
Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis.
United Nations (different issues), Demographic Yearbook, New York:  Department of International
Economic and Social Affairs.
Varshney, A. (1993),”Urban Bias in Perspective,” Journal of Development Studies, 29 (4), 3-22.
Wallerstein, I. (1974), The Modern World System, New York: Academic Press.
Wallerstein, I. (1979), The Capital World-Economy. London, Cambridge University Press.
Wheaton, W. C. and H. Shishido (1981),”Urban Concentration, Agglomeration Economies, and the Level
of Economic Development,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 30, 17-30.24
Appendix
Countries:
The 30 countries, in alphabetical order, are:  Argentina (SEMI, CEN) Bangladesh (PERI, CEN), Bolivia*
(PERI,  CEN), Brazil (SEMI, FED), Canada (CORE, FED), Chile (SEMI, CEN), Colombia
(SEMI, CEN), Costa Rica* (PERI CEN), Dominican Republic (PERI, CEN), Ecuador (PERI,
CEN), El-Salvador* (PERI, CEN), Guatemala* (PERI, CEN), Honduras* (PERI, CEN), India
(SEMI, FED), Indonesia (PERI, CEN), Japan(CORE, CEN), Korea (south)(SEMI, CEN),
Malaysia (SEMI, FED), Mexico (SEMI, FED), Pakistan (SEMI, CEN), Panama (PERI, CEN),
Paraguay* (PERI, CEN), Peru (PERI, CEN), Philippines (SEMI, CEN), Sri Lanka (PERI, CEN),
Taiwan (SEMI, CEN), Thailand (SEMI, CEN), United States (CORE, FED), Uruguay (PERI,
CEN), and Venezuela (SEMI, FED).  Countries with an asterisk are not in the 24-country sample
in Section V.  Countries labeled CORE, SEMI, or PERI are core, semiperipheral, and peripheral
countries in the world-systems allocation.  Countries labeled CENT or FED have centralized or
federal governments.
Variables and Sources
PRIMACY1-2*: the ratio of the largest city’s population to that of the second largest city. Urban
population data are from The UN World Urbanization Prospects:  The 1992
Revision, The Europa World Yearbook, The Statesman’s Yearbook, and the
World Development Report.
PRIMACY1-4: the ratio of the largest city’s population to that of the next three largest cities.  See above
for source.
PRIMACY2-2: the ratio of the two largest cities’ population to that of the next two largest cities. See
above for source.
GDP: gross domestic product.  GDP is calculated from the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6).
GDPC: gross domestic product per capita.  Source:  The Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6).
POPLAND: population density which is the ratio of the total population to the arable land.  Sources:
total population data are from The UN World Urbanization Prospects:  The 1992
Revision; arable land data are from FAO Production Yearbook (see www.fao.org.).
DCAP: dummy variable that equals 1 if the capital city is also the largest city and equals 0
otherwise.  Sources:  UN Demographic Yearbook, and World Urbanization Prospects:
The 1992 Revision.
EXPORT exports of goods and nonfactor services as a percentage of GDP.  Sources:  World Tables,
1994 and different issues of World Development Report.
INDUST: share of labor outside agriculture.  It is calculated as 1 minus the percentage of
economically active population in agriculture.  Source:  FAO Production Yearbook.25
FREE: freedom variable (1 = free, 2 = partially free, 3 = not free).  Sources:  different issues of
Gastil’s Freedom in the World, and Bollen (1990), for cross-sectional data, it is averaged
over 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990.
BE: a measure of bureaucratic efficiency.  It is an index of subjective rankings of the efficiency
of the judiciary system, red tape, and corruption.  Source: Mauro (1995)
EDUC: is average years of schooling of people 25 years and older from Barro and Lee (1993), and
from different issues of the UN Human Development Report
URBDISP: The urban-rural disparity is the ratio of ratio of output per worker in nonagriculture (i.e.,
the percentage of nonagriculture GDP divided by percentage of labor force in
nonagriculture) to output per worker in agriculture (i.e., the percentage contribution of
agriculture to total GDP divided by the percentage of the labor force in agriculture).  The
data for percentage contribution of agriculture to total GDP are from various issues of
World Tables and World Development Report, and data for percentage of the labor force
in agriculture are from FAO Production Yearbook
FDI: Foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP.   FDI data are from various issues of
IMF Balance Of Payments Yearbook and IMF International Financial Statistics.
* Data for the Republic of China (Taiwan) are from different issues of The Republic of China Statistical
Yearbook, The Europa Yearbook, and The Statesman’s Yearbook.26
  TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
1990 Values
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
PRIMACY1-2 30 5.1778 5.5609 1.138 25.49
PRIMACY1-4 30 2.1917 1.9998 0.5050 9.399
PRIMACY2-2 30 5.2737 3.2285 1.7056 15.4721
Bureaucratic
efficiency
24 4.96 3.00 2.25 9.75
GDP* 30 368570 867790 6983 4520000
GDP per capita 30 4612.0 4426.7 1264 18050
GDP per capita
squared*
30 40213 82746 1598 325900
Population* 30 75700 158300 2418 849500
Land area* 30 20127 44544 285.0 187900
Population density 30 8.2797 7.3156 0.5782 29.98
Education 30 6.0290 2.6825 1.900 12.30
Capital city
indicator
30 0.80000 0.40684 0.0000 1.000
Export’s share of
GDP














28 0.0095 0.0140 -0.0260 0.05884
Political freedom 30 1.5000 0.50855 1.000 2.000
*(000)27
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2 .97 .96 .97 .97 .96 .96
t statistics in parentheses below the coefficient
***, **, * significant for two tailed tests at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.29
TABLE 4
Estimates of the Determinants of Primacy Differentials























































































OBS 30 30 30 24 24 24 24
R
2 ADJ 0.08 0.34 0.32 -0.00 0.29 0.49 0.48
t statistics in parentheses below the coefficient
***, **, * significant for two tailed tests at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively
ENDNOTES
                                                       
1Other recent reviews of the literature are available.  Lemelin and Polese (1995) examine the bell-shaped,
primacy-development hypothesis and review the economics and geography literature.  Smith (1996)
emphasizes the sociological literature, and Varshney (1993) overviews the urban bias literature.
2 Sheppard (1982) reviews theoretical and empirical analyses of size distribution and Mulligan (1984)
surveys theoretical contributions to central place theory.
3Mutlu (1989) includes size of country as one of the primary determinants of primacy.  He defines it,
however, as area or population.  He also measures economic development as per capita GNP and includes
it in his model.  Our approach differs because we include three dimensions of size–population, area, and
GDP.  Our approach therefore is more flexible.
4El-Shakhs (1972), Rosen and Resnick (1980), and Wheaton and Shishido (1982) use summary measures
of the size distribution to measure urban concentration, but they do not interpret their measure as a
deviation from a rank-size relationship.  El-Shakhs limits his cities to the five largest, Rosen and Resnick
use the 50 largest, and Wheaton and Shishido used enough of the largest cities to account for 70 percent of30
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the urban population.  These data were collected only for one year--a cross section.  Constructing a 30 year
time-series of urban size distributions for the countries in our sample using as many cities as Rosen and
Resnick and Wheaton and Shisshido did, even in five-year increments, was not practical.
5Two Chinese cities (Shanghai and Beijing) are excluded because the sample omits socialist or formerly
socialist countries.  Similarly Lagos is excluded because of the omission of African countries.  The
included cities are, in order of size, Tokyo, Mexico City, Sao Paulo, New York, Bombay, Los Angeles,
Calcutta, Buenos Aires, Seoul, Osaka, Delhi, Rio de Janeiro, and Karachi.
6  Africa was excluded from the sample for two reasons.  First, colonialism, in general, was just ending for
the African countries in 1960, whereas it ended somewhat earlier for most of the relevant Asian countries in
our sample and much earlier for the American countries.  Our purpose is to analyze primacy in countries
where market forces have more scope to operate. Although the dead hand of the external political effects of
colonialism affects most of the countries, we control that effect with dummy variables.  By excluding the
African countries, we concentrate more on the post-colonial period.  Second, we excluded the African
countries because we thought it would be less likely that we could find the necessary data for most of the
countries beginning in 1960.  In an earlier study using data for 1960, 1970, and 1980, Moomaw and
Shatter (1996) concentrated on urbanization and included African countries in the sample.  Although the
urbanization data were available, when they attempted to get data on metropolitan population about one-
half of the African countries had to be dropped (See Shatter, 1992).  Because the data for this study
requires population data for individual large cities in 5-year increments, as well as other variables that were
not collected in the Shatter study, we judged that the availability of data for African countries would
preclude us from obtaining a representative sample from Africa.  Moreover, the quality of the data is
probably lower for these countries.  The benefit of including more countries did not, in our opinion,
outweigh the cost of collecting the incomplete and lower quality data.
7  Two of the variables that Mutlu (1989) finds important, income distribution and ethnic homogeneity, are
controlled, arguably, by the fixed effects.  Both variables would have little variation over three decades.
8  Land is measured as arable land and it taken from the FAO Production Yearbook. (See www.fao.org.)
The variation in arable land over time for countries is limited but great enough to estimate the model.  It is
remarkable that the coefficient of the land variable is estimated as precisely as it is.
9The fixed effects are recovered from an estimate of the equation in column 1, Table 3 except that the
export share is excluded.2008
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